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INTRODUCTION

In the nascent spectrum of legal expertise known as "computer
law," few segments have grown more rapidly over the past decade
than software protection. And in the realm of intellectual property
law, no subject matter has generated more interest during that period
than software. Indeed, at the intersection of these two areas of law,
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interest has mushroomed, as evidenced by a sharp increase in demand
for counseling on how best to protect software, and by the crescendo
of litigation directed toward its protection.
Before one can make knowledgeable choices among the various
mechanisms and techniques available for protecting software,l it is de
sirable to inquire into the inherent nature of software and its develop
ment, its traditional sources, and the legal and extra-legal methods
available for its protection. Perhaps the best place to begin is by defin
ing the subject matter. 2
"Software" is a term used somewhat differently by various au
thors, but which generally comprises three classes of subject matter:
computer programs ("programs"); data bases; and documentation.
For present purposes, a program can be regarded as a series of instruc
tions in machine-readable form, prepared to achieve a certain result.
A program, therefore, is the intelligence communicated to the com
puter by the human in the latter's attempt to get the machine to do his
or her bidding. A data base is a machine-readable representation of
information. It may be an employer's list of employees arranged al
phabetically, a firm's list of customers arranged by zip code, etc. It is
entered into the computer, which then operates upon it. Documenta
tion refers to all documents (generally human-readable) which explain
the operation of other software or of computer hardware. For exam
ple, documentation might discuss the methods used by a particular
program to achieve its result, or might describe how to use the
program.
This article shall concentrate on the program, although parts will
apply to data bases. Documentation is generally considered ancillary
to some other entity (e.g., a program) and is rarely treated separately.
II.

UNUSUAL ASPECTS OF THE COMPUTER PROGRAM

What is so "special," technically, commercially, or legally, about
programs that they merit such attention?
.
In some respects program protection may be treated as an in
stance of process protection. In other respects, however, the program
is unusual, if not unique. One important reason why programs may be
"special" is their ubiquity.3 Now involved far beyond the computer
room, they are with us from the electronic switches of our telephone
1.

For a detailed explanation of software protection, see I D. BENDER, COMPUTER
§§ 3.01, 3.02, 3A.01-.07, 4.01-.09, 4A.OI-.03 (1984).
See generally id. §§ 1.05, 2.06.
By the end of 1982, there were more computers than people. Lowell, Digits to the

LAW: SoFTWARE PROTECfION,

2.
3.
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system to the carburetors of our automobiles. Even when we travel
into space we cannot escape them - indeed, we cannot so travel with
out them.
Technologically, the program is quite unusual in that it may as
sume a number of different forms, which makes it confusing to under
stand. Commercially, programs are unusual in that some people, even
those technologically "savvy" in other areas, often do not appreciate
the value of programs. In the early days of the computer industry vast
numbers of valuable programs were made available to users, free of
charge. While few still give their programs away, many still do not
fully realize the value of programs. Perhaps this failure to recognize,
or accord full value to, this distinct corporate asset is attributable to
the mystique which sometimes surrounds the computer. If so, it will
doubtless dissipate along with that mystique.
Another reason why the program is arguably "special" is that it
has already achieved enormous value, and is probably by far the fastest
growing major type of technical subject matter. Total investment in
software in the U.S. exceeds $200 billion,4 and the industry is in its
infancy.
Legally, programs are quite unusual because they are surrounded
by uncertainty with regard to each branch of law which may arguably
be used to protect them.
III.

THE NATURE OF A COMPUTER PROGRAM

A program can exist in a number of different forms, and recogni
tion of this fact is necessary to effect any successful protection effort.
Doorstep, 1 PROTO 2 (1983). An estimated one million programs a year are created. Cas·
tillo, Bill Safeguards Data Programs, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1980, at 01, col. 2.
4. Reiling and Lester, Marketing Software Products, 8 AM. PAT. L.Q.J. 294 (1980).
In 1974, less than 10% of our data processing costs went to software. Today, the figure is
50%, and by 1990 it is predicted to rise to 80%. McClellan, End of the Hardware Era,
Datamation, May I, 1984, at 122.
In 1981, mo_re than $8 billion in software was marketed. ADAPSO, SIXTEENTH AN
NUAL SURVEY OF THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY 53 (1982). In 1983, $2.1 billion in program
products were marketed, with an estimate of $12 billion by 1988. Parceling out the
Software, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1983, at 01, co1.2. Those figures do not include the gigan
tic sums of money spent by companies to create and maintain software for their own use.
Users of mainframe computers spent $5.6 billion for software in 1978, and $8.4 billion
in 1980. Missing Computer Software, Bus. Week, Sept. I, 1980, at 46 (estimate of Int'l Data
Corp.). Total software costs for 1990 have been estimated at $25 billion. Rush of New
Companies to Mass-Produce Software, Bus. Week, Sept. I, 1980, at 54. According to the
Government Accounting Office (GAO), by 1985, 90% of the federal government's comput·
ing costs will be for software. Missing Computer Software, Bus. Week, Sept. I, 1980, at 46.
In 1980, 80% of the Air Force's computing budget was for software (up from 20% in
1970). Id.
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The program germinates in the minds of the persons who desire and/
or create it. The first precursor of a program is a vision of some vague
creature needed to fulfill a specific function. This is the "require
ments" or "problem definition" or "specification" stage.
In the minds and hands of its designers, it takes a more definite
form. The entity is broken into parts (modules), each of which is fur
ther subdivided. The nature, relationship, and interfaces of these parts
. are determined: This is the "architecture" stage.
The specific methods for solving the problem are fashioned. This
is the "logic" or "algorithm" stage. s This may involve a "flowchart,"
wherein the program's logic is depicted graphically by a sequence of
oddly shaped boxes connected by lines and arrows, meant to show the
various processing steps and flow of data. The flowchart is effectively
the program's blueprint.
The program is then coded (the "coding" stage), resulting in a
sequence of instructions in a rigidly defined language which typically
has a vague resemblance to simple English. This is the "source pro
gram" and, while comprehensible to the programmer, it is not directly
intelligible to the computer. Accordingly, the source program is trans
lated into an "object program," a sequence of "bits" (zeroes and ones)
which the computer understands (but which is not easily intelligible to
the programmer). As the program is coded, much time will be spent
testing it, to exorcise as many of the inevitable programming errors as
possible (de-bugging). Finally, the persons who have designed and
created the program create the documentation describing it.
In either source or object form, the program can be represented
on various media. It can be handwritten on coding sheets (generally
not machine-readable), or embodied on cardboard cards in the form of
small rectangular punched holes or on tape in the form of magnetic
impulses, etc. The machine-readable embodiment of the program (the
deck of punched cards) is a "programming device," and is sometimes
loosely called "the program." But in a more fundamental sense, the
program is the intangible set of instructions embodying the architec
ture, logic, and testing, rather than any tangible embodiment. The set
of source program instructions can be printed out in sequence, to form
the "listing."

5. An algorithm is a rigidly defined, step-by-step procedure for solving a particular
problem in a finite number of steps. The algorithm yields a solution to the particular prob
lem under all circumstances.

410
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SOURCES OF COMPUTER PROGRAMS

There are a number of sources for programs. Perhaps the most
obvious is the hardware vendor, and most (if not all) computers are
sold with some programs included in the price. 6 The programs most
likely to be included are those generic to the hardware's operation,
regardless of the specific task required by the user; these are called
"system" or "control" programs. Beyond that, most manufacturers
also offer "application" programs, which are directed to a particular
function such as printing out a payroll, or updating an accounts re
ceivable file. Today the manufacturer typically includes some pro
grams in the price of the hardware, and licenses others for an
additional fee. 7
A second source of programs is the user's own company. The
majority of programs in use are probably user-created. When an or
ganization has a specific problem for solution by computer, its first
impulse typically is to create the necessary program in-house. Billions
of dollars worth of programs are so created annually; most are of im
mediate use only to the organization creating them.
A third way of obtaining a program is to commission a "software
house" to create it. 8 Most software houses will provide, under con
tract, "custom" software to the specifications of those desiring it. 9 A
fourth way to get programs is through user groups or software clear
ing houses.
A fifth, and increasingly important way of obtaining use of pro
grams, is to secure rights in a "program package" (also called a pro
6. For a discussion of various hardware vending agreements, see Gordon & Starr,
Software Development Contracts and Consulting Arrangements: A Structure for Enforce
ability and Practicality, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 487, 493-505 (1985).
7. Ten years ago, "almost all" programs were supplied by the hardware manufactur
ers (presumably this excludes user-created programs). Today, independent software houses
account for one third of the $14 billion dollar annual market, predicted to rise to a half by
1988. McClellan, supra note 4, at 122.
Some estimate that IBM's 1980 revenues for separately licensed software exceeded $1
billion. Missing Computer Software, supra note 4, at 46. IBM's 1984 revenues for sepa
rately licensed software have been forecast to be 5 billion. Verity, Call Unbundling Sign of
Future Software-Driven Industry, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Nov. 10, 1980, § II, at 13.
8. Software houses are companies whose business is largely the creation, mainte
nance, and modification of programs. One estimate places the number of software houses
at 4,000 in 1984. McClellan, supra note 4, at 122. In 1980 there were over 8,000 software
houses with over 30,000 customers. Rush of New Companies to Mass-Produce Software
supra note 4, at 54. The "independent" (i.e., non-mainframe manufacturer) software com
panies had 1980 revenues of $2 billion, and could top $8 billion in 1985. No Patents - But
Still Protected, Bus. Week, Oct. 20, 1980, at 102.
9. See Gordon & Starr, supra, note 6 at 493.
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prietary program, program product, or canned program). Unlike
hardware, software reproduction involves no bending of metal, or
other labor-, space-, and material-intensive activity. As a result, once
the program has been created, even if its creation cost over a million
dollars, creating an additional copy (e.g., a duplicate magnetic tape
embodying the program) costs less than a hundred dollars. A develop
ing company could hope to market a program of widespread utility to
numerous users. Each user would pay far less than the cost of creating
the program, while the creating company, by marketing to many
users, could hope to recoup far more than its cost. Accordingly, eve
ryone might come out ahead. \0
Some believe the program product did not begin to blossom until
1969, when IBM announced it was "unbundling."ll In 1970, program
package revenues were $25 million. 12 By 1972 there were some 60
program products each of which had achieved lifetime fees of a million
dollars.13 By 1977 their number had grown to 302,14 and by mid-1980
their number increased to 432.15 Some programs have been marketed
to over a thousand installations. 16 By 1979, program products had
annual revenues well in excess of a billion dollars, with a predicted
annual growth rate through 1985 of over 20% (twice as high as the
computer hardware business). 17
The program package has several possible advantages vis-a-vis a
custom program: it can be operational much sooner; it should be
10. A good program product is more than simply a program available for licensing.
It must be extensively debugged, reasonably easy to use, and accompanied by adequate
documentation. It must also have a reasonably long useful life (preferably at least five
years), widespread utility, improvement potential, and the ability to compete well against
alternative program products. Finally, it must be priced right.
11. "Bundling" was the practice whereby computer manufacturers sold their hard
ware and software together as a single unit. The user did not have to use the manufac
turer's software, but he did have to pay for it. See McGee, Financial Tax Accounting for
Computer Software, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 651, 652-53 (1985).
12. Rush of New Companies to Mass-Produce Software, supra note 4 at 54.
13. Million Dollar Software Grows, Computerworld, Feb. 21, 1973, at 25, (reporting
on a study done by International Computer Programs, Inc);
14. Software Winners' Ranks Swell, Computerworld, March 27, 1978, at 2. Two of
these each accounted for over $50 million. Id.
15. See Goetz, When IBM Unbundled, Computerworld, Jan. 7, 1980, at 35; Goetz,
Software Packages: Best buy Today, Datamation, Dec. 1979, at 136; Bulkeley, Computer
Makers Feel Key to Sales Edge Lies in Better Programming, Wall St. J. Sept. 29, 1980, at I,
col. 6. By 1980 there was a program package with total revenues in excess of $100 million.

Id.
16. See A. RALSTON & E. REILLY, JR., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
AND ENGINEERING 373 (2nd ed. 1983).
17. The market for software products tripled between 1980 and 1984. Software and
Services Updates, Datamation, Oct. 15, 1984, at 185.
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much less expensive; and by eliminating much "re-inventing of the
wheel," it makes a more economic use of what we are increasingly told
is a scarce resource - programmers. IS Some possible disadvantages
vis-a-vis a custom designed program are longer running time, in
creased memory requirements, and the necessity for expensive and
time-consuming alterations to adapt it to the user's situation.
The manner in which the user generally acquires a right to use in
a program package is by taking a license. The license may also be the
mechanism for acquiring rights in custom-designed programs, but
more frequently such programs will simply be sold, rather than li
censed, to the user (such a sale, because of the attributes of programs,
involves its own intricacies). 19 Further, licensing is one mechanism by
which users acquire rights in manufacturer-created software. As a re
sult of all this, licensing is by far the most important vehicle for ac
quiring rights in software created by another.
V.

LEGAL METHODS FOR PROTECTING SOFTWARE

As a form of intellectual property, software is arguably protect
able under patent law, copyright law, and/or trade secret law. As to
patents, uncertainty exists with respect to applicability to most pro-·
grams, although it is now clear that certain programmable processes
and programmed machines are appropriate for patent protection. As
to copyrights, there appears to be extensive applicability, but uncer
tainty exists with respect to the scope of protection. And while classi
cal trade secret law clearly applies to programs, there is a question as
to whether that venerable corpus of law still exists in its traditional
form.
A.

Patent Protection of Programs
1.

Nature of Patent Grant

A United States patent grants to its owner the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention in the
United States for seventeen years. 20 It does not, however, confer on
18. As of 1980, although there were some 543,000 programmers and systems ana
lysts in the United States the average Fortune 1000 company was estimated to have two
years of programming waiting to be done. Bulkeley, supra note 15, at 1.
19. See Gordon & Starr supra, note 6, at 493.
20. Patent protection is granted in 35 U.S.C. § 154 which states in pertinent part:
Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a grant to the paten
tee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen years. . . the right to exclude
others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
States. . . .
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the owner the exclusive right to practice that invention, because one or
more other patents may also cover the invention. So, for example, if a
patent for a carburetor co-existed with a patent for a dual-barrelled
carburetor, the owner of the latter could not lawfully manufacture his
invention without a license from the owner of the former. However,
seventeen years after a patent issues, the owner loses all right to
exclude.
2.

Obtaining a U.S. Patent

One seeks a patent by filing and prosecuting a patent application
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The application
should "contain a written description of the invention, and the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled"21 in the appropriate tech
nology to make and use it; a statement of the best mode contemplated
by the inventor; and one or more claims pointing out the subject mat
ter regarded as the invention. 22 These claims specifically delineate the
metes and bounds of the invention, much as a deed sets forth the
boundaries of real estate.
The preparation and prosecution of a patent application is a tech
nical and detailed task. An application can be filed and prosecuted
only by the inventor or by a registered patent attorney or patent agent.
Each year roughly 100,000 patent applications are filed and some
70,000 patents issue. 23 The average time between filing of the applica
tion and issue of the patent is currently between 2 and 2 1/2 years.24

3.

Requirements for a U.S. Patent

There are many requirements which must be satisfied for a valid
U.S. patent to issue. First, there is a strict standard of nove1ty.2S Be
yond this, there is a requirement that the invention not be "obvious"
to one skilled in the appropriate area of technology. 26 While these
Id.
21. Id. § 112.
22. Id.
23. D. WALLACHINSKY & I. WALLACE, THE PEOPLE'S ALMANAC 82 (1975).
" 'Every man, woman, and child is a potential inventor,' says Isaac Fleischman, longtime
public information officer for the U.S. Patent Office, 'and 90% of them have tried to invent
something. . . .''' Id. "[O]ver 100,000 patent applications are filed each year, and in 1973
54,960 U.S. Citizens were granted patents, which is one patent per 3,790 persons." Id.
24. Id. at 83.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
26. Id § 103.
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requirements are generic and not limited to program-related inven
tions, they will preclude patents on most programs.
4.
a.

Statutory Subject Matter

What Types of Inventions can be Patented?

A patent may be obtained on any useful, new and non-obvious
"process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof."27 Most (but not all) of the litiga
tion, as well as writing, on whether programs are protectable by patent
has been on this "subject matter" issue. Specifically, the question
posed has been whether or not the claimed invention constitutes a
programmable "process" or programmed "machine," as those terms
are used in patent law. Basically, this has been reduced to the question
of whether the invention is a mathematical algorithm (non-statutory)
on the one hand, or a non-mathematical algorithm, or the application
of an algorithm (statutory), on the other.
b.

U.S. Supreme Court Cases

The subject matter issue has been considered on four occasions by
the United States Supreme Court. In Gottschalk v. Benson,28 the
Court held claims non-statutory for wholly pre-empting an "al
gorithm."29 The question left by the ambiguous language of that deci
sion was whether a claim was rendered non-statutory for preemption
of any algorithm, or rather solely for preemption of a mathematical
algorithm.
In Parker v. Flook,30 the court stated that any mathematical al
gorithm in the claim must be treated as well-known, and if no novelty
remains, the claim is not patentable. 31 The court also asserted that a
claim directed to an improved method of calculation using a formula,
even if the solution to a particular end use, is non-statutory.32 A vig
orous three-judge dissent accused the majority of confusing the subject
matter standard with the novelty standard. 33
In Diamond v. Diehr,34 a five to four majority decided a number
of important points. First, they held that in determining whether a
27. Id. § 101.
28. 409 u.S. 63 (1972).
29. Id. at 71-72.
30. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
31. Id. at 592-94.
32. Id. at 594-95.
33. Id. at 600.
34. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
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claim is statutory, "claim dissection" into old and new portions is im
proper; the claim must be analyzed as a whole, rather than at the
"point of novelty" as the PTO had been inclined to do. 3s Accordingly,
the Court divorced section 10136 subject matter considerations from
section 102 37 novelty considerations. In addition, the Court inter
preted Benson's use of the term "algorithm."38 In Benson, the ques
tion left undecided by ambiguous language was whether the court's
ruling was limited to mathematical algorithms or was meant to extend
to all algorithms. Diehr provided a clear answer: The Benson rule was
limited to mathematical algorithms. 39 Finally, the court specifically
held that the statutory nature of a claim "is not altered by the fact that
in several steps of the process a mathematical equation and a program
med digital computer are used."40
Diamond v. Bradley,41 which the Court affirmed four to four
without opinion, also stands for the proposition that the mere fact that
a computer is involved in the claim cannot negate the presence of stat
utory subject matter. 42
c.

PTO Guidelines

Shortly after the Supreme Court decided Diehr and Bradley, the
PTO issued guidelines. 43 The test embodied in these guidelines is to
first determine whether a mathematical algorithm is directly or indi
rectly recited in the claim, and if so, to ask if the claim merely recites a
mathematical algorithm.44 If the answers to both questions are in the
affirmative, the claim is non-statutory; otherwise it is statutory.4S
d.

Lower Court Cases

In the wake of Diehr and Bradley, the CCPA decided several
cases providing useful standards and applications. In In re Taner,46
the court held that a claim reciting the "summing" of electrical signals
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 188-89.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
Id. § 102.
450 U.S. at 184-86.
Id. at 186, n.9.
Id. at 185.
450 U.S. 381 (1981).
42. Id.
43. Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2110, Patentable Subject Matter:
Mathematical Algorithms or Computer Programs (1981).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 681 F.2d 787, 214 U.S.P.Q.(BNA) 678 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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- which the court characterized as a mathematical algorithm - was
actually directed to a conversion of electrical signals, deemed to be a
statutory process, even though the "physical apparitions" could be ex
pressed in mathematical terms. 47
In re Pardo48 reiterated the two-step test to be used in determin
ing whether program-related claims are statutory: (1) to determine
whether a mathematical algorithm is directly or indirectly recited; and
(2) if it is, to determine from analyzing the claim as a whole, whether
the algorithm is applied in any manner to physical elements or process
steps. If the answer to both questions is affirmative, the claim is statu
tory.49 The court applied that test to the steps of examining, compil
ing, storing, and executing formulas internally in a computer so as to
convert it from a sequential processor to one whose functioning is not
dependent on the order in which it receives instructions. The court
ruled there was no mathematical algorithm directly or indirectly re
cited in these steps. so
In In re Abele,S! the court dealt with an algorithm conceded to be
mathematical. The court held that one claim presenting no more than
calculation and subsequent display of a number was non-statutory.S2
However, another claim which required the input of data resulting
from passing an X-ray through a CAT scanner was held statutory. 53
The production, detection, and display steps were statutory, regardless
of the presence of an algorithm, and it was in connection with them
that the algorithm was applied. Accordingly, the rule embodied in
Abele seems to be that if a mathematical algorithm is applied in any
manner to physical elements or process steps, provided that the appli
cation is circumscribed by more than a field of use limitation or non
essential post-solution activity, the claim is statutory. 54
In re Meyer S5 dealt with claims for analyzing the results of tests
on a complex system. Although no mathematical formula was recited
in the claims, the court held that the decisive factor was whether the
method was essentially a mathematical calculation. S6 The purpose of
47. Id. at 790-91, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 681-82.
48. 684 F.2d 912, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing In re WaIter, 618
F.2d 758, 767, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397, 407 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
49. Id. at 916, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 676.
50. Id. at 916-17. 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677.
51. 684 F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
52. Id. at 908, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 687-88.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 688 F.2d 789, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (Cust. Ct. 1982).
56. Id. at 795-96, 215 U.S.P.Q. (DNA) at 198.
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the invention was partially to replace, with a computer, the thought
processes of a neurologist. The applicant acknowledged that the
claims recited a mathematical algorithm. The court concluded the al
gorithm had not been applied to physical elements or process steps
and was, therefore, non-statutory. 57
5.

Infringement

In the very earliest days of the computer industry, there was no
such thing as a program. Computers were instructed through numer
ous circuits made by connecting wires and jacks on large structures
resembling telephone switchboards. This was extremely cumbersome
and time-consuming, and was soon replaced by the stored computer
program. Crucial to an understanding of programs, however, is the
tenet that there is an equivalence between software (the program) and
hardware (the wired circuit). For every program there exists an
equivalent hardware circuit, and vice versa.
Moreover, there is an entity which stands conceptually between
hardware and software; aptly enough, it is called "firmware" or "read
only memory" (ROM). ROM comprises part of the computer's mem
ory, indelibly imprinted with a program. This is in contrast to the
software situation, where programs are read into memory, which is
then effectively erased seconds or minutes later, when the instant job is
terminated and the computer is readied for the next. There is gener
ally full functional equivalence among hardware, software, and
firmware.
This equivalence raises some interesting questions. First, can use
of a programmed computer infringe a hardware patent? One court
has answered that question in the negative58 while another has ruled
that a "means plus function" apparatus claim, where hardware is dis
closed, is infringed by a programmed digital computer. 59 Another in
teresting - and thus far unanswered - question is whether, where a
"program patent" issues, equivalent hardware may infringe it.
57. Id. at 796, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 198-99.
58. Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Ass'n, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602,638-40
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977). The
court held that "means plus function" claims (see 35 U.S.c. § 112 (1982» were not in
fringed by a general purpose computer programmed to perform the same function as the
claimed apparatus. Digitronics, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 640.
59. Arshal v. United States, 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 749 (Ct. Cl. 1979), affd on other
grounds, 621 F.2d 421, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 397 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
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Advantages and Disadvantages of Patent Protection

The advantages of patent protection for software include the fol
lowing: (1) patent protection is well suited to an invention which may
enjoy great proliferation; (2) patents protect against independent in
vention (one corollary is that in litigation, the plaintiff need not show
copying); (3) the protective duration is seventeen years, relatively long
in the program milieu; (4) once secured, patent protection may be
maintained with relative ease60 and aids in licensing; and (5) because
the owner has an exclusive right in the algorithm he or she may freely
disclose how the program works - which may be an important mar
. keting tool.
Among the disadvantages of patent law in the software milieu are
the following: (1) it is difficult to obtain preliminary relief in the event
of litigation;61 (2) many types of programmable processes and
programmed machines may ultimately be held to be non-statutory
subject matter; (3) there is present commercial uncertainty arising
from this fact, even if many types of programs should eventually be
held patentable; (4) most valuable programs will not qualify for pat
ents even if the subject matter is appropriate since they will run afoul
of the novelty and non-obviousness requirements; (5) even if a pro
gram may be patented, this may be possible only if it is claimed in an
awkward and unnatural manner; (6) the cost of securing patent pro
tection may be relatively high;62.(7) the interim between filing a patent
application and issue of a patent typically exceeds two years,63 often a
significant part of the program's lifetime; (8) patent protection is not
applicable to data bases or documentation; (9) because the patent itself
is a public document, it is difficult to police unlawful use; (10) patents
may have a more restricted ambit of proper exploitation than alterna
tive methods;64 (11) if the owner is party to an antitrust consent judg
ment requiring him to license all patents, such patents are presumably
included; and (12) aside from any problems unique to software, the
60. But see 35 U.S.C. § 41 (1981) (requiring maintenance fees for patents).
61. Some feel that the law may be about to change on this point. See Smith Int'l v.
Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir.), em. denied, 104 S. Ct. 493 (1983).
62. In the case of a patent which issued in 1980 on a sort process embodied in a
popular program product, it was reported that the cost to prosecute the application was
about $100,000. Rosenberg, Whitlow Sort Processes Patented, Computerworld, July 28,
1980, at 55.
63. Prosecution of the patent referenced in the immediately preceding note required
some eight years. Id.
64. The doctrine of patent misuse renders unenforceable a patent used in a manner
deemed by a court to be contrary to public policy. Morton Salt Co. v. O.S. Suppieger Co.,
314 U.S. 488, 52 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 30 (1942).
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entire U.S. patent system has problems manifested both in the PTO
and the courtS.6S

B.

Copyright Protection ofSoftware

Copyright protects an author's original expression or form, as op
posed to idea or concept. It protects against copying but not against
independent origination. The problems inherent in the application of
copyright law to programs include whether programs constitute copy
rightable subject matter, and if so, determining the scope of copyright
protection. The Copyright Office long ago announced a policy favor
ing copyrightability of programs. 66
1.

Statutes

The new Copyright Act, generally effective January 1, 1978,67
contains section 102(a):
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of ex
pression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, whether di
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device . . . .68

The Act, as enacted in 1976, also contained section 117:
Nothwithstanding the provisions of Sections lO6 through 116
and 118, this title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a
work any greater or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work
in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, process
ing, retrieving, or transferring information, or in conjunction with
any similar device, machine, or process, than those afforded to
works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law or stat
65. Positive steps taken to rectify this problem include (a) creation in 1982 of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to which all patent infringement appeals
now go. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c)-1292(d), 1295 (1982), and (b) increased funding for the
PTO.
66. Library of Cong. Info. Bull. 226 (May 18, 1964).
From 1976 through mid-1980, only 2,000 programs were registered with the Copy
right office. No Patents-But Stil/ Protected, Bus. Week, Oct. 20, 1980, at 102. However,
this was not indicative of the degree of reliance on copyright, as registration, although
necessary for enforcement, may not be necessary for protection. In the past few years the
number of registrations for programs has increased sharply.
67. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982) (publ. L. No. 94-553 (Oct. 19, 1976». The legisla
tive history is found at S. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. Rep. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 56, 59; and H.R. Rep.
No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5810.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
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utes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable
and construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 69

A commission was created by Congress70 to study the problem of pro
tecting programs. CONTU recommended legislation:
The new copyright law should be amended: I) to make it ex
plicit that computer programs, to the extent that they embody an
author's original creation, are proper subject matter of copyright;
2) to apply to all computer uses of copyrighted programs by the
deletion of present Section 117; and 3) to ensure that rightful pos
sessors of copies of computer programs may use or adapt these cop
ies for their use.1 1

The Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, embodying the
CONTU recommendations, was enacted into law in December 1980.72
It added a definition to section 101 of the Copyright Act:
A "computer program" is a set of statements or instructions to
be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a

certain result. 73

It also replaced the original section 117:
§ 117. Limitations on exclusive rights: computer programs.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an in
fringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make
or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that com
puter program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essen
69. Id. § 117.
70. NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF CoPYRIGHTED
WORKS, Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (hereinafter CONTU). For a discussion
of the creation of CONTU, see generally Stem, Section 117 ofthe Copyright Act: Charter of
the Software Users' Rights or an Illusive Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459 (1985).
71. FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CoMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF CoPYRIGHTED WORKS, 1 (1978) (hereinafter CONTU REPORT). Commissioner
John Hersey, the noted author of the CONTU REPORT, dissented vigorously on the basis
of his conviction that a computer program is not a "writing" in the Constitutional sense:
"The Congress shall have the power. . . To promote the Progress of Science [i.e., philoso
phy] . . . by securing for limited Times to authors . . . the exclusive Right to their Writ
ings. . . ." U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8. "The Act of 1976 should be amended to make it
explicit that copyright protection does not extend to a computer program in the form in
which it is capable of being used to control computer operations." CONTU REPORT at 37.
72. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3028 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982».
73. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). An extensive discussion of § 117 is found in Stem, supra
note 70, at 459-85.
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tial step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such a new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes
only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that con
tinued possession of the computer program should cease to be
rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of
this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with
the copy from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the
lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adapta
tions so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of
the copyright owner.
One possible problem posed by the statute is whether it is Consti
tutional. Some have suggested that defining a program as copyright
able subject matter may run afoul of the Constitutional dichotomy74
between the domains of the patent (excluding practice of the tangible
embodiment of an idea) and of the copyright (protecting the copying
of an expression).75 This argument traces its heritage back at least as
far as Baker v. Selden,76 which held that where the use of copyrighted
forms was necessary to practice an accounting method explained in a
book containing the forms, it was not copyright infringement to so use
the forms.77 Further, some read Selden to hold that if it is impossible
to separate idea from expression, use of the expression cannot consti
tute copyright infringement. The patent/copyright relationship was
further explored in Mazer v. Stein,'8 wherein the court held that a
particular statuette lamp base was copyrightable subject matter be
cause its aesthetic qualities were separable from its utilitarian
aspects. 79
More recently, the second circuit decided whether certain three
dimensional artistic belt buckles were copyrightable under the old Act
74. Indeed, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) provides:
To no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless ofthe form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in such work.
75. See Commissioner John Hersey's dissent in the CONTU REPORT, supra note 71,
at 27-37.
76. 101 u.s. 99 (1879).
77. Id. at 101-104.
78. 347 U.S. 201, reh'g denied, 347 U.S. 949 (1954).
79. See id. at 214-19. But see Esquire Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978), reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917 (1979) (copyright protection denied
for the overall shape of a light fixture because the aesthetic element could not be severed
from the utilitarian element).
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and the new. 80 The trial court held that they were not because they
"fail[ed] to satisfy the test of separability and independent existence of
the artistic features, which is required under both statutes."81 On ap
peal, the defendant argued the buckles were uncopyrightable as being
"useful articles" without sculptural features that could be identified
separately from, or were capable of existing independently of, the utili
tarian aspects. 82 Noting that separability may occur either physically
or conceptually, the second circuit held the buckles copyrightable be
cause the "primary ornamental aspect . . . is conceptually separable
from the subsidiary utilitarian function."83
Judge Weinstein dissented, asserting that the innovations of artis
tic form were inseparable from the function 84 and that the 1976 Act
protects only those useful articles which can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, utilitarian as
pects. 85 He noted further that the "overall design or configuration of a
utilitarian object, even if it is determined by aesthetic as well as func
tional considerations, is not eligible for copyright."86 According to
the dissent, the distinction is between "ornamental and superfluous de
signs contained within useful objects" and "artistically designed func
tional components of useful objects."87 Indeed, Judge Weinstein
stated that in propounding the 1976 Act, Congress considered and re
jected extending copyright protection to the design of a useful arti
80. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 208 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1 (2d Cir. 1980).
81. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 732, 736, 206
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 439, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
82. Id. Both the old and new law deny copyrightability to such an article. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
83. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993, 208 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1980). No claim was made that the buckles lacked originality or
creativity, and the court stated that they "[rose] to the level of creative art." Id. at 994,208
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 2.
84. Id. at 994, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 6 (Weinstein, J., dissenting)."It is the origina
tor's success in completely integrating the artistic designs and the functional aspects of the
buckles that preclude copyright." Id.
85. Id. at 995, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 6 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 996, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 7 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (quoting Esquire,
Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908, reh'g denied, 441 U.S.
917 (1979».
Indeed, one author suggests that as applied to artistic writings the idea/expression
"dichotomy is at best difficult to apply and at worst wholly inapplicable. . . . copyright
does protect some ideas." Note, Derivative Works and the Protection of Ideas, 14 GA. L.
REV. 794, 812 (1980).
87. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 996, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 7 (Weinstein, J.,
dissenting).
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cle. 88 Acknowledging the policy question of whether encouraging art
is more important than permitting the less afHuent to enjoy such
works, he left this question for Congress. 89
2.

Copyright Cases Relating to Software Protection

Although the first such case was not decided until 1978, cases are
now cascading through the lower courts. These cases suggest there
may be no area in which it is more important for courts to grasp the
fundamentals of computer technology than in the area of copyright
protection for software. The first case dealing squarely with infringe
ment of a copyright on a program is Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A
Group.90 Defendant marketed a game including a ROM which em
bodied plaintiff's program. Plaintiff had no copyright notice, except
on all copies of the source program (used internally by plaintifi), for
which copyright registration was secured a year after plaintiff began
marketing the program. 91
Plaintiff sued for copyright infringement and sought a prelimi
nary injunction. Defendant moved for summary judgment. 92 In both
ROMs, the program was in object form. 93 The district court con
cluded that "the 'source program' is a writing while the 'object pro
gram' is a mechanical tool or machine part."94 The court determined
that the applicable law was the old copyright law so that either the
common law or the 1909 Act would control on the issue of whether a
ROM was a copy.95 Further, the court held that under either stan
dard the ROM was not a copy. "In its object phase, the ROM, the
computer program is mechanical tool or a machine part but it is not a
'copy' of the source program."96
Finally, the court noted in dictum that if the 1976 Act did apply,
copying a ROM would not constitute infringement because, while a
ROM is a "copy" under that Act, that Act did not apply to programs
88. Id. at 997, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 8 (Weinstien, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 999, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 9-10 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). In 1981 legis
lation was introduced in the House to amend the Copyright Act so as to "provide for
protection of ornamental designs of useful articles." H.R. 20, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
90. 480 F. Supp. 1063, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 735 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d
1038, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1971 (7th eir. 1980).
91. Id. at 1065-66, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 738-39.
92. Id. at 1065, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 738.
93. Id. at 1066, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 738.
94. Id. at 1065, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 738.
95. Id. at 1067, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 740.
96. Id. at 1066-67, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 741.
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"in their object phase, i.e., ROM."97
The court of appeals affirmed summary judgment, stating it was
unnecessary to reach the issue of whether a ROM was a copy, and
ruling that when it entered the public domain, the work lacked proper
copyright notice so that under the applicable 1909 Act, copyright was
forfeited. 98 While purporting not to consider whether under the 1909
Act a ROM constituted a copy of the program embodied in it, the
court - apparently without considering that issue and in the face of
its statement that it need not reach it - implicitly decided in the af
firmative. 99 For in determining that pUblication occurred prior to
1978, the court looked to section 26 of the 1909 Act, which defined
"date of publication" as the earliest date when "copies" were placed
on sale. 1OO
A somewhat earlier case, also of interest for its reasoning, is
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 101 which
raised the question of whether a program could infringe a copyright on
an input format form. 102 Defendant developed a program similar in
function to plaintiffs, but which accepted its input in a different ar
rangement. Because plaintiff had a significant market position, de
fendant determined that defendant's marketing potential would
increase if the input prepared by plaintiffs users for use with plaintiffs
programs, could also be used with defendant's programs. 103
Accordingly, defendant created a "preprocessor program" whose
function was to take input designed for plaintiffs program, and to con
97. Id. at 1066-67 n.4, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 739-740 n.4. Two reasons were
stated: (1) "In its object phase, the computer program is a mechanical device which is
engaged in the computer to become an essential part of the mechanical process," and
"[m]echanical devices which cannot qualify as pictorial [or] graphic. . . works are not
writings and may not obtain copyright protection;" and (2) the Copyright Office's then
proposed (and subsequently adopted) regulations on affixing notice contained language
which seemed not to contemplate copyrightability of ROM's. Id.
98. Id. at 1041, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 199.
99. Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS&A Group, 628 F.2d 1038, 1041,208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
197, 199 (7th Cir. 1980).
100. Id. at 1042, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 200.
101. 462 F. Supp. 1003, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
102. An "input format" is the arrangement of data to be input to the computer, so
that the computer will recognize each item for what it is and for what its form is. As to
each item there is a prescribed location (e.g., sixth location in the format), unit (e.g., me
ters), and a particular manner of presentation (e.g., six digit decimal form with two digits to
the right of the decimal point). Format is a concept that may be expressed by means of
input format forms, which are specially prepared forms permitting insertion of input data
in the proper arrangement and form.
103. 462 F. Supp. at 1006, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 540.
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vert it into the form of input for defendant's program. 104 Plaintiff con
tended that defendant's preprocessor infringed the copyright on
plaintiff's format form. "The [programming] statements in its
preprocessor program are derived directly and precisely from the
copyrighted manual card formats."lOs Looking to section 101 of the
1909 Act,106 which granted to the copyright owner the exclusive right
"to translate the copyrighted work into other languages or dialects, or
make any other version thereof,"lo7 plaintiff contended that the
preprocessor infringed because it did "no more than translate the ex
pression of the formats to a different computer language."lo8
The court wrestled mightily with the question, asking if "se
quencing and ordering is expression, what separable idea is ex
pressed?" 109 The court concluded that the formats would be
copyrightable if the ideas they expressed were separable from their ex
pression; it ruled that they were not separable. I \0
Plaintiff also apparently contended that defendant's preprocessor
infringed the copyright in plaintiff's manual. I I I The court stated that
translating the copyrighted program from one computer language to
another would infringe, and that programming a copyrighted
flowchart would probably infringe. But preparing a program from a
general description of the problem would be quite dissimilar to trans
lation of a literary work and would not infringe:
In most cases, the formulation of the problem in sufficient de
tail and with sufficient precision to enable it to be converted into an
unambiguous set of computer instructions requires substantial im
agination, creativity, independent thought, and exercise of discre
tion, and the resulting program can in no way be said to be merely a
copy or version of the problem statement. 112

The most significant copyright software protection case to date
may be Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,m which
104. Id. at 1006-07, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 540-41.
Id. at 1012, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 545.
106. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1909) (amended 1976).
107. Id.
108. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1012, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 546.
109. Id. at 1013, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 546.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 1004, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 538.
112. Id. at 1013 n.5, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 546 n.S.
113. 54S F. Supp. 812, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 935 (E.O. Pa. 1982), rev'd, 714 F.2d
1240, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113 (3d Cir. 1983), cerro dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). This
action was settled before the Supreme Court acted on defendant's petition for a writ of
certiorari. See Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1984, at 10.
105.
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inquired into the patent/copyright dichotomy. Plaintiff alleged copy
right infringement as to system programs embodied in ROMs and
floppy disks. In denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunc
tion, the district court was of the view that object code embodied in a
silicon chip ROM1I4 might not be protectable by copyright as not con
stituting a fixed expression of an original work. 1IS
The third circuit reversed. 116 Defendant did not dispute copying,
and its factual defense was that it was not feasible for it to write its
own operating system programs. 1l7 Defendant's principal legal de
fense was that system programs were not susceptible to copyright
protection. 1IS
The appellate court saw three issues" (1) whether copyright can
exist in a program expressed in object code; (2) whether copyright can
exist in a program embedded in ROM; and (3) whether copyright can
exist in a system program. 119
On the first point, the third circuit found no statutory basis for
distinguishing source code from object. 120 It also found that its own
opinion in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artie International, Inc., 121
dealt with many of the doubts expressed here by the district court.122
The 1976 Act states two requirements for a work to constitute copy
rightable subject matter: It must be (1) an "original work of author
ship,"123 and (2) "fixed in a tangible medium of expression."124
Section 102(a) enumerates seven types of "works of authorship," and
the court found that the legislative history suggested that programs
114. Presumably code embodied in a floppy disc would be similarly unprotectable.
115. Franklin, 545 F. Supp. at 820, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 943-44.
116. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113 (3d Cir. 1983).
117. Id. at 1245,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 117. Defendant seemed to be saying it was
not feasible for defendant to rewrite the system software so as to be compatible with plain
tiff's application programs. The espoused reason was that there were too many "entry
points" in relationship to the number of instructions in the program. Entry points are
those locations in the system program which can be used to mesh the application programs
with the system program. Defendant also alleged that "identical signals" were necessary to
ensure 100% compatibility. The evidence was mixed on whether in fact the system pro
grams could have been rewritten so as to be compatible. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1246, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 118.
120. Id. at 1247,219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 119.
121. 685 F.2d 870, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 405 (3d Cir. 1982).
122. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1983).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
124. Id.

1985]

SOFTWARE PROTECTION

427

were within the section 102(a) definition of literary works.12s
The CONTU Report recommended that the law be amended to
make it explicit that programs, to the extent they embody an author's
original creation, are copyrightable. 126 The 1976 and 1980 versions of
section 117 dealt only with the scope of protection. "The language of
the [1980] provision, however, by carving out an exception to the nor
mal proscriptions against copying, clearly indicates that programs are
copyrightable and are otherwise afforded copyright protection."'27
The third circuit noted that in Williams Electronics, it concluded
that copyrightability of programs was established after the 1980
amendment, and it had there rejected the argument there was a dis
tinction between copyrightability of a source code program and of its
object code form.12s
The district court's suggestion that copyrightability depended on
a communicative function to individuals emanated from the White
Smith Music Co. v. Appollo Co.,l29 which held that a player piano roll
was not a copy of a musical composition because it was not in a form
people generally could perceive. The court suggested that the piano
roll was not a copy because it was not intelligible to humans, but
rather could be read only by a machine - a player piano. '30 But the
appellate court found it clear from the language and the legislative
history of the 1976 Act that it was intended to obliterate the White
Smith distinction. 131 Moreover, the CONTU majority took the posi
tion that object code was appropriate for copyright; 132 this, in the face
of a dissent based on the theory that the machine control phase of a
program is not directed to humans. 133
Turning to the copyrightability of a program embedded in a
ROM, the court found that issue also decided in Williams Electron
ics. 134 Defendant there argued that copyright would not apply to a
ROM because it was a utilitarian object or machine part. The Wil
liams court held that "fixation" was satisfied through embodiment of
125. [d. 685 F.2d at 875, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 409.
126. CONTU REPORT, supra note 71, at 37.
127. Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113, 120 (3d Cir. 1983).
128. Williams Elec., 685 F.2d at 876-77, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 409.
129. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
130. [d. at 18.
13!. Williams Elec., 685 F.2d at 877 n.8, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 410 n.8.
132. CONTU REPORT, supra note 71, at 38.
133. [d.
134. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249,219
U.S.P.Q. (DNA) 113, 121 (3d Cir. 1983).
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the expression in the ROM.13S Accordingly, the court reaffirmed that
"a computer program in object code embedded in a ROM chip is an
appropriate subject of copyright." 136
The court next turned to what it viewed as defendant's main con
tention: that system programs are excluded from copyright protection
under 17 U.S.c. section 102(b), and under Selden. 137 Defendant made
two arguments: (1) an operating system program is a process, system,
or method of operation and, therefore, uncopyrightable;138 and (2) in
the case of system software, idea merges with expression so that the
former cannot be used without reproducing the latter; accordingly,
copyright cannot bar such use. 139
The court agreed with the defendant's contention that underlying
section 102(b)140 and Selden is the distinction between property sub
ject to the patent law, and property subject to the copyright law. 141
But the court believed that defendant misapplied the distinction. In
the court's view, the plaintiff sought to copyright not the method
which instructs the computer to perform its oprating functions, but
rather the instructions themselves. "Since it is only the instructions
which are protected, a 'process' is no more involved because the in
structions in an operating system program may be used to activate the
operation of the computer that it would be if instructions were written
in ordiQ.ary, English in a manual. ... "142 Moreover, the court saw
defendant's contention as inconsistent with its concession that applica
tion programs are appropiate for copyright protection. 143
135. Williams Elee., 685 F.2d at 874, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 408.
136. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1983).
137. Id. Defendant viewed Selden as standing for three propositions: (1) use of a
system does not infringe a copyright on the description of the system; (2) copyright does
not extend to purely utilitarian works; (3) copyright may not be used to monopolize an
idea. Id. at 1250, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 121-22.
138. Id. at 1250, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 122.
139. Id. at 1253, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 124.
140. For the text of § 102(b) see supra note 74.
141. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1983).
142. Id. at 1250, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 122.
143. Id. at 1251, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 123.
Both types of programs instruct the computer to do something. Therefore, it
should make no difference for purposes of section 102(b) whether these instruc
tions tell the computer to help prepare an income tax return (the task of an appli
cation program) or to translate a high level language program from source code
into its binary language object code from (the task of an operating system
program). . . .
Id.
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The court concluded the defendant's argument that:
an operating system program is part of a machine mistakenly fo
cuses on the physical characteristics of the instructions. But the
medium is not the message. . . ." The mere fact that the operating
system program may be etched on a ROM does not make the pro
gram either a machine, part of a machine, or its equivalent. 144

The court agreed with the CONTU majority that programs
should no more be considered machine parts than videotapes should
be considered parts of projectors. 145
The defendant also contended operating systems could not be
copyrighted because they are purely utilitarian, and the plaintiff
sought to block use of the art embodied in its operating system. l46
The court saw this argument as stemming from dictum in Selden:
. . . where the art [taught by a book] cannot be used without em
ploying the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or
such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be
considered as necessary incidents to the art, given therewith to the
public; not given for the purpose of publication in other works ex
planatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical application. 147

The court rejected what it saw as the expansive reading given this
language by some other courtS. 148 Defendant's interpretation of this
language precluded copyrightability where the work is put, to use.
However, the court saw that interpretation as rejected in Mazer v.
Stein :149 "We see nothing in the copyright statute to support the ar
gument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible
for copyright bars or invalidates its registration."15o
144. Id.
145. Id. (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 71, at 21).
146. Id.
147. Selden, 101 U.S. at 103.
148. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 123 (3d Cit. 1983). For an example of such expansive reading, see,
e.g., Williams Elec., 685 F.2d at 877, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 409.
149. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
150. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218). The Third
Circuit noted that the CONTU majority agreed '!that the words of a program are used
ultimately in the implementation of a process should in no way affect their copyright
ability." Id. (quoting CONTU REPORT, supra note 71 at 21). ''The copyright status of the
written rules for a game or a system for the operation ofa machine is unaffected by the fact
that those rules direct the actions of those who play the game or carry out the process." Id.
The court considered "the CONTU Report as accepted by Congress since Congress wrote
into the law the majority's recommendations almost verbatim." Id.
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The court noted that under Selden, as interpreted in Mazer, "a
copyright gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is
given only to the expression of the idea - not the idea itself."lsl The
dichotomy is embodied in section 102(b), which the legislative history
indicates was intended "to make clear that the expression adopted by
the programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer program,
and that the actual processes or methods embodied in the program are
not within the scope of the copyright law."ls2
Noting that courts have found difficulty in drawing the line be
tween idea and expression, the court stated that in the case of an oper
ating system, the line must be a pragmatic one balancing competition
on the one hand, against protection on the other.ls3
If other programs can be written or created which perfonn the
same function as an Apple's operating system program, then that
program is an expression of the idea and hence copyrightable. In
essence, this inquiry is no different than that made to detennine
whether the expression and idea have merged, which has been
stated to have occurred where there are no or few other ways of
expressing a particular idea. IS4

Defendant claimed that whether or not the programs could be
rewritten, there were a limited number of ways to arrange an operat
ing system to enable a computer to run Apple-compatible application
programs. According to the court this claim had no pertinence to the
practice/expression dichotomy or to merger. 155
The idea which may merge with the expression, thus making
the copyright unavailable, is the idea which is the subject of the
expression. . . . If other methods of expressing that idea are not
foreclosed as a practical matter, then there is no merger. [Defend
ant] may wish to achieve total compatibility with independently de
veloped application programs written for the Apple II, but that is a
commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into the
somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and ex
pression, have merged. IS6

Another basis for the court's conclusion was that the statutory
151. Id. (quoting Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217).
152. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CoNG.
& AD. NEWS 5659, 5670.
153. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1983).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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definition of a computer program did not distinguish between applica
tion and operating programs. The court noted that the district court
in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula International, Inc. IS7 found no dis
tinction,IS8 and that Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc. IS9
had upheld the copyrightabilty of an operating system without dis
cussing the issue. l60
Accordingly, the denial of the preliminary injunction was re
versed 161 and the case was remanded. 162
The past four years have seen a cascade of cases involving pro
gram copyright, with the vast majority espousing the propriety of pro
tecting object code in ROM form.163
157. 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
158. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252,219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Formula, 562 F. Supp. at 780).
159. 524 F. Supp. 171,214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 178 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
160. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252, 219
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173,214 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 179.)
161. Id. at 1255, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 126. The appellate court also reversed the
district court finding that plaintiff had not made the requisite showing for irreparable harm,
because the lower court failed to recognize that "a copyright plaintiff who makes out a
prima facie case of infringement is entitled to a preliminary injunction without a detailed
showing of irreparable harm." Id. at 1254, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 125. Aside from that,
the appellate court found substantial evidence of the considerable effort and investment by
plaintiff in developing the programs in suit. Thus, even without the presumption of irrepa
rable harm, plaintiff showed irreparable harm. Id.
162. Id. at 1255, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 126. Because the record was unclear on
whether some or all of the operating programs represented the only means of expressing the
idea underlying them, the court stated that necessary findings could be made on remand.
Id. at 1253, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 124.
163. The following cases treat these and related issues. In some of them the copy
right was on a videotape of a ROM-driven videogame. Stem Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669
F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'I, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775
(C.D. Cal.), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management
Assistance, Corp., 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (D. Idaho 1983); Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group,
Inc., 1984 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 11 25,613 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983); S&H Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS Inst., Inc.,
568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 718
(N.D. Cal. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.J.
1982); Nintendo of America v. Bay Coin Distributors, 1983 CoPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH)
1125,409 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D.
Ill. 1981), afJ'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); Atari, Inc. v.
North American Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1265 (N.D. Ill.
1981), rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cerro denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Williams Elecs.,
Inc. V. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc. V. Williams, 1983 Copy
RIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 11 25,412 (E.D. Cal. 1981); Tandy Corp. V. Personal Micro Com
puters, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Atari, Inc. v. Armenia, Ltd., 1981
COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 11 25,328 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Atari, Inc. V. Amusement World,
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Drikschneider, 543 F. Supp.
466 (D. Neb. 1981); BPI Sys. V. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981); In re Certain
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The Work Made for Hire Doctrine

Section 21O(b) of the Copyright Act provides:
(b) Works made/or hire - In the case of a work made for hire,
the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered to be author for the purposes of this title and, unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright. 164

Section 101 defines a "work made for hire" as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for
use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation,. . . , if the par
ties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire. . . .165

To date there appears to be only one software-related case on this
point. In BPI Sys., Inc. v. Leith,166 the plaintiff was developing an
accounts receivable system and contracted with defendant to produce
some twelve programs to be embodied in that system. The controlling
issue was whether these programs constituted work made for hire, or
in other words, whether the defendant was the plaintiff's employee.
The court decided the question in the negative,167 and denied relief.
An interesting case not related to software was Black, 168 in which
the court held that when an employer materially breaches the employ
ment agreement, there arises a claim for rescission of the contract,
Personal Computers and Components Thereof, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 270 (Int. Tr. Comm.
1984); In re Certain Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 217 (Int.
Tr. Comm. 1981); Cinematronics, Inc. v. K. Noma Enters. Co., Ltd., D. Ariz. Civ. 81-439
PHX-EHC; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Sutra Import Corp., D. Ariz., Civ. No. 81-438 PHX
CLH.
164. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
165. Id. § 101.
166. 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
167. Id. This work was performed at [d]efendant's place of business on his
own computers. He was paid per program and no social security or income tax
was deducted from his pay. Although [p]laintiff could accept or reject the final
product, it had no right to control the manner of the work performed by
Ld]efendant. To aid him in the project, [p]laintitf supplied him with certain inter
nal, confidential documents which were not available to the public . . . . De
fendant was not an employee of [P]laintiff acting within the scope of his
employment. The work he did was specially ordered and commissioned but there
was no written agreement that the work was 'work made for hire.'

Id.
168. Black v. Pizza Time Theatres, Inc., 1983 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
(N.D. Cal. 1983).
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"including the implied right to authorship."169 By analogy, similar
argument may be made in the absence of an employer/employee rela
tionship where the parties have executed a writing specifying that the
work is made for hire.
It is anticipated that the work made for hire doctrine may result
in more problems in the program scenario than in more traditional
areas of copyright protection. The reason is that in certain segments
of the software industry it is common to take a working module which
performs a particular function, and incorporate it in a second program
where, with or without modification, it will perform a similar function.
It may then be taken from the second program and, with or without
modification, installed in a third. Further, loose consulting arrange
ments without written agreement often are the modus operandi of the
software industry. Accordingly, this may give rise to more work made
for hire problems than in an area such as book publishing.
4.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Copyright Protection

Among the advantages of copyright protection for programs are:
(1) the relative ease and inexpensiveness of securing 170 and maintain
ing it; (2) its suitability for great proliferation; (3) the extraordinary
duration of protection; and (4) the realistic possibility of securing pre
liminary relief in the event of litigation. Among the disadvantages are:
(1) the uncertainty of its applicability to programs; (2) even more fun
damentally, the uncertainty as to scope of protection; and (3) the diffi
culty of policing.

C.

Trade Secret Protection of Software
1.

Classical Trade Secret Protection

Trade secret is in fact the method which has been used more fre
quently than any other to protect software.l7l A trade secret is "any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used
in one's business and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it."172 Basically,
the traditional trade secret doctrine states that when a business has
secret information which gives it a commercial advantage over com
169. Id.
170. Indeed, under the 1976 Act, the program is copyrighted upon being represented
in tangible form. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
171. For a discussion of trade secret protection of software, see Bender, Trade Secret
Protection ofSoftware, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 909 (1970); Bender, Trade Secret Software
Protection, 5 Am. P.L.A.Q.J. 49 (1977).
172. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §757 comment b (1939).
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petitors not in possession of the information, a court will afford protec
tion against unauthorized use or disclosure, but not against one who
independently develops.173 Programs, data bases, and documentation
may all be protectable as trade secrets. Various characteristics and
representations of programs such as algorithms, architecture, and flow
charts may likewise be protectable.
Unlike its statutory cousins, the scope of whose applicability is in
issue, traditional trade secret law clearly applies to programs. The
scope of protection seems reasonably clear}14 Trade secret rights arise
by operation of law in many situations where a confidential relation
ship is to be implied, such as the employer/employee relationship. But
even in such situations, a well drafted contract may be preferred, as it
can serve to make rights more specific, to give notice, and to create
additional rights. 17s A study conducted a year before enactment of the
Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 concluded that software
developers would continue to rely most heavily on trade secret protec
tion for their programs. 176
One interesting point is that trade secret protection is available
against appropriation by memory; 177 no tangible item need be carried
off,178 This view was affirmed in a case dealing with software}19 An
173. See generally RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, 758 (1939).
174. See, e.g., Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 184 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 521, 5
Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 1 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975);
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 183 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 70S, 5 Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 1248, reh'g. denied, 505 F.2d 1304 (5th
Cir. 1974); Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. V. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020, 6
Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 999 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Co. 1977); see also Elec
tronic Data Sys. Corp. V. Kinder, 497 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1974); Com-share, Inc. V. Com
puter Complex, Inc., 458 F.2d 1341, 3 Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 479 (6th Cir.
1972); Structural Dynamics Research Corp. V. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Electronic Data Sys. Corp. V. Powell, 508 S.W.2d 137
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
175. However, there is a tendency by courts to strictly construe such a contract,
thereby extinguishing any pre-existing rights. Accordingly, care should be exercised in
drafting the agreement. See Gordon & Starr supra, note 6 at 488-89.
176. Kidder, Peabody Study, reported in Call Trade Secret Laws Best Way to Protect
Investment, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Jan. 14, 1980, at 54.
177. Were such protection unavailable, trade secret protection of programs might be
partly academic. Competent programmers and systems analysts spending much of their
time with a program remember the program's structure, large segments of the algorithms
and portions of the coding.
178. Support for this position is stronger for the technological trade secret than for
the collection of information (Le., the customer list, and presumably the data base).
179. Cybertek Computer Prods., Inc. V. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1020, 6
Computer L. Serv. Rep. (Callaghan) 999 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977). For the general rule, see,
e.g., A. H. Emery CO. V. Marean Prods. Co., 268 F.Supp. 289, 153 U.S.P.Q. 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), affd, 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 835 (1968); Jet Spray Cooler, Inc.
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other interesting point is that trade secret law has its criminal side. 180
Aside from general larceny statutes which may apply,181 about half of
the states have specific trade secret theft statutes. 182 While United
States copyright law has criminal sanctions (for willful infringe
ment),183 the patent law has none.
2.

The Preemption Problem

However, a recent challenge to classical trade secret protection is
posed by the possibility of preemption for this entire corpus of law, or
particular aspects of it, by Section 301(a) of the new Copyright Act:
On or after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights that are within the gen
eral scope of copyright as specified by Section 106 in works of au
thorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by Sections 102
and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether pub
lished or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. There
after, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right on
any such work under the common law or statutes of any State. 184

The existence of this section poses the issue of whether it
preempts trade secret protection, wholly or in part, and the past few
years have witnessed a number of cases dealing with possible preemp
tion of diverse areas of law.
v. Crampton, 361 Mass. 835, 282 N.E. 2d 921, (1972); Central Plastics Co. v. Goodson, 537
P.2d 330, 189 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 748 (Okla. 1975).
For a discussion of trade secret protection available against appropriation by memory,
see Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, supra note 171 at 909, 938-41; Bender,
Trade Secret Software Protection, supra note 171, at 55-59.
180. For a discussion of this aspect, see Bender, Trade Secret Protection ofSoftware,
supra note 171, at 942-56. See also Bender, Trade Secret Software Protection, supra note
171, at 59-65.
181. See Hancock v. State, 402 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966), affd sub. nom.
Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1967) (per curiam). Indeed, the trade secret
criminal statutes seem to be used more in the case of software than in the case of any other
type of subject matter. Three reasons are often given as justification for the necessity of a
criminal remedy: (1) difficulty of civil suit; (2) judgment-proof misappropriators; and (3)
empty threat of civil suit where only nominal investment is necessary for misappropriator
to exploit. The second and third bases are more likely to apply to a misappropriator of
software than of most other types of subject matter.
182. For an example of prosecution under such a statute for software misappropria
tion, see Ward v. Superior Court of Calif., 3 Computer L. Servo Rep. (Callaghan) 206 (Cal.
Super. 1972). See also Soma, Smith & Sprague, Legal Analysis ofElectronic Bulletin Board
Activities, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV., 571, 621 (1985).
183. 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1982).
184. Id. § 301(a).

436

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7:405

In the trade secret area, one case l8S held that a complaint alleging
that defendant "without proper authority obtained and improperly
utilized copies of. . . proprietary drawings" states a claim which is
preempted by section 301(a) because "The facts relate to rights that
are equivalent to the exclusive rights belonging to a copyright
holder. . . ."186 The court believed preemption mandated where a
claim does not allege the elements of "invasion of privacy, a trespass, a
breach of trust or a breach of confidentiality,"187 and the court ruled
that this claim (specifically denominated as being for "misappropria
tion of trade secrets") failed to allege such an element. 188 And in a
case involving a computer program, a court held at least certain as
pects of state trade secret law were pre-empted by federal copyright
law. 189
In another case involving a computer program, however, another
district court held that section 301 does not preempt, because a trade
secret claim is not "equivalent" to copyright claim. l90 "It is well set
tled that copyright protection extends not to an idea itself, but rather
to the particular expression. . . . In contrast, the protection provided
by the common law of trade secret misappropriation extends to the
very 1'deas . . . . 191
3. Combined Trade Secret and Copyright Protection of
Programs
Some have suggested attempting to secure the advantages of both
copyright and trade secret protection. In such a situation the owner
marks the program with both copyright notice and proprietary legend.
The intention is to keep the program secret. The copyright marking is
meant to provide protection only in the event this fails, and the pro
185. Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 894 (M.D. Ala.
1980), affd on other grounds, 676 F.2d 494 (11th Cir.), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982).
186. Id. at 895-96.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 897-98. Other cases dealt with neither computer programs nor trade
secrets, and held that there was no preemption as to unfair competition. Factors, Etc., Inc.
v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090,208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (a right to
publicity); Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496F. Supp. 408, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
630 (S.D. Ohio 1980)(a state statute relating to "blind bidding" for motion pictures); Le0
nard Storch Enter. v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 623 (E.D.N.Y.
1979), complaint dismissed, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (misappropriation by
photographically reproducing typefaces).
189. Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp 1471 (D. Nev. 1983).
190. Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 367, 368
(N.D. III. 1981).
191. Id.
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gram markings may so state. Once the owner elects to utilize copy
right protection, he or she may presumably register and deposit copies.
It can be argued that disseminating with copyright notice, even in
a confidential relationship and where accompanied by a proprietary
notice, constitutes "publication" and thereby strips the program of its
trade secret status. An ancillary and more fundamental question goes
to whether seeking this type of bifurcated protection may be inher
ently inconsistent with public policy. One. major purpose of the copy
right law is to promote disclosure. The question may be legitimately
raised as to whether copyright protection should be countenanced
when the owner's real purpose is to thwart disclosure and to rely on
his copyright (if one exists) only if this fails and publication occurs as a
result of events beyond the owner's control.
In a case involving an allegation that defendants misappropriated
plaintiffs computer system reference manual, the document had been
marked with both a proprietary legend and a statutory copyright no
tice. 192 The district court held that the act of affixing the copyright
notice did not, as a matter oflaw, defeat the trade secret claim. 193 The
court of appeals, dealing only with the argument of estoppel (and not
treating the Constitutional and policy arguments which might be
made), agreed. 194
4.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Trade Secrets

Among the advantages of trade secret protection of programs are:
(1) the real possibility of securing preliminary relief in the event of
litigation; (2) its clear applicability; (3) its applicability to intermediate
(flow chart) and ancillary (documentation) materials; (4) the broad
scope of protection (concept, disclosure, and use); (5) the relatively
limited opportunity for misuse, because generally there is not uncon
trolled proliferation; (6) the possibility of lengthy duration; and (7) the
rapidity with which protection can attach (immediately).
There are, however, several disadvantages to trade secret protec
tion of programs. One disadvantage, from the viewpoint of society if
not the developer, is the unfortunate effect which the resultant "cess
pool of secrecy" may have on progress in the field. A second disad
vantage is that secrecy is not well suited to a product for which wide
192. Technicon Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, 211
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 343 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
193. Id. at 347.
194. Technican Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, 687 F.2d
1032,215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1001 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983).
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proliferation is sought. Indeed, there may be inherent in the definition
of a trade secret the notion that it not be known to most competitors
of the owner or user.19S However, in one case dealing squarely with
that issue (where software was the res in question),196 the court saw no
infirmity arising by virtue of mere proliferation. A third disadvantage
is the possibility of an immediate loss of protection, should the secret
become public. A fourth disadvantage is that affirmative steps must be
taken to maintain the trade secret. Finally, the possibility of pre-emp
tion is a recognizable disadvantage.
VI.

THE SHRINK WRAP LICENSE

The "shrink wrap" is a phenomenon which has arisen in re
sponse to an attempt to protect relatively inexpensive, mass marketed
software. A brief historical summary will be helpful in describing how
certain pertinent aspects of the software industry have changed, and
given rise to such a need.
In the early days of computing, a typical mainframe computer
cost hundreds of thousands (and perhaps over a million) dollars. The
application software was all custom developed, and a typical program
might cost tens of thousands (or even more than a hundred thousand)
dollars. Then, slowly, the concept of the program package made in
roads. However, a typical program package for a mainframe com
puter might cost on the order of $50,000. Legal protection in those
days was provided almost exclusively by the law of trade secrets, with
a written license contract signed by the parties. It was drafted by law
yers and often the transaction was negotiated by lawyers.
The key elements were that each such transaction was substantial
and that the parties were corporations, to whom contracts and lawyers
were a way of life.
However, the technology advanced rapidly. The price of hard
ware plummeted and the industry saw the introduction of the personal
computer. Today, most computers in existence cost less than $10,000;
indeed many cost less then $2,000. As the price of hardware fell, in
creasing numbers of computers were sold. As to certain models, there
are presently hundreds of thousands of units. On some models, there
are more than one million units extant. Today a copy of a typical
195. The Restatement of Torts lists six factors for use in the determination as to
whether a trade secret exists. One is the extent to which the subject matter is known
outside the enterprise; another is the ease with which it may properly be acquired by others.
REsrATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment 10, at 6 (1939).
196. Management Science America, Inc. v. Cyborg Syst., Inc., 6 Computer L. Serv.
Rep. (Callaghan) 921 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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personal computer program may be marketed at a price in the range of
fifty to perhaps eight hundred dollars. These are marketed over the
counter like expensive jelly beans. At these prices, there are no law
yers; moreover, even asking the buyer to sign a form contract is
viewed by many as imposing an impediment to sales.
In this environment, how does the software developer protect his
investment? One proposed solution is the shrink wrap (also called the
boxtop, tear-open, or blister) license. The programming device on
which the copy of the program is embodied is a floppy disk 197 or a
ROM198 which comes encased in a clear plastic wrapper. Visible
through this wrapper is a sheet of paper bearing, in large print, a no
tice stating that whoever breaks the wrapper199 thereby agrees to a list
of stated conditions.
A question sometimes asked is why the marketer bothers with
such a procedure. Why not simply copyright the program and let it go
at that? Aside from the fact that the scope of copyright protection is
not well established, the answer generally given is that there are ele
ments of protection which can probably not be secured by copyright
alone and which many software developers view as valuable. For ex
ample, the copyright law would not prohibit the owner of a copy, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, from selling or leasing
that copy. Or, the developer may wish to limit the use of each copy to
a particular computer or terminal. Copyright alone will not do that.
Furthermore, the developer may wish to protect the trade secrets em
bodied in the program against reverse engineering and disassembly.2°O
Again, copyright alone may not serve the purpose.
Accordingly, many vendors now sell copies of their programs ac
companied by a shrink-wrap license. Possible problems arise in con
nection with this practice. For example, a valid contract requires offer
and acceptance, and there is a question as to whether this has been
achieved in the typical shrink-wrap situation. The buyer presumably
paid his consideration at the time he purchased the copy, which is
before he opened the wrapper or otherwise purportedly activated the
terms of the shrink wrap license. However, to the extent there has
197. A floppy disk looks like a 45 rpm phonograph record, and records the program
on one or both surfaces in the form of magnetic impulses. It is similar to a hard disk,
except that the floppy disk is generally smaller and flexible.
198. The actual tiny silicon chip comprising the ROM is embodied in a plastic casing
about the size of a cigarette pack.
199. Alternatively, the notice may key acceptance to breaking an inner wrapper
(which contains only the programming device), or using the programming device.
200. See Gordon & Starr supra, note 6 at SOL

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

440

[Vol. 7:405

been any acceptance of those terms, presumably it took place only
when he opened the shrink wrap. Is it possible to convert a sale into a
license?
Moreover, there appears to be a modern trend in consumer ori
ented law which makes it difficult to enforce "adhesion contracts"
where the result is deemed unfair. Would that pose a problem for the
shrink wrap license? Further, a litigation problem is posed by the pos
sible difficulty of proving notice. Since many purchasers of copies of
personal computer programs have not yet reached the age of majority,
they may not possess the capacity to enter into a contract. There ap
pear to be no cases on point as yet.
VII.

INTERNATIONAL SOFTWARE PROTECTION

There are two ways of seeking software protection abroad. One is
by using an international copyright convention or treaty and the other
is by using the domestic law of the country in question.
A.

By Convention

There are two important multilateral copyright conventions. The
Berne Convention (formally the International Union for the Protec
tion of Literary and Artistic Works) is administered by the World In
tellectual Property Organization (WIPO).201 Although the United
States has never joined the Berne Convention, American nationals can
secure its protection through pUblication in a Berne country simulta
neously with publication in the United States. 202 The Universal Copy
right Convention is administered by UNESCO.203 Under this treaty,
201. As of January 1, 1984, the following nations had ratified the Berne Convention:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belguim, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cam
eroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech
. oslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, German Democratic Republic,
Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guinea, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ire
land, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Lebanon, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mada
gascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Kingdom, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and
Zimbabwe. 4 M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT App. 22 (1984).
202. Berne Conv., Art 6(1) (Brussels Act); Art 3(1)(b) (Paris Act). See generally 4
M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, § 17.04(d) (1984).
203. As of January 1, 1984 the following nations had ratified the Geneva Act of 1952
and the Paris Act of 1971. The following chart has been reprinted with permission from 4
M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT App. 22 (1984), Copyright © 1984 by Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc.
Contracting State
Paris Act of 1971
Geneva Act of 1952
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works of U.S. nationals wherever published must be granted by all
Algeria
Andorra
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belguim
Belize
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czechoslavakia
Democratic Kampuchea
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Equador
EI Salvador
Fiji
Finland
France
German Democratic
Republic
Germany, Federal Repub
lic of
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Haiti
Holy See
Hungary
Iceland
India
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Kenya
Laos
Lebanon
Liberia
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malawi
Malta

July 10, 1974

August 28, 1973
September 16, 1955
February 13, 1958
May I, 1969
July 2, 1957
December 27, 1976
August 5, 1975
June 18, 1983
August 31, 1960
December I, 1982
January 13, 1960
June 7, 1975
May I, 1973
August 10, 1962
September 16, 1955
June 18, 1976
September 16, 1955
June 18, 1957
January 6, 1960
September 16, 1955
February 9, 1962
May 8, 1983
June 5, 1957
March 29, 1979
October 10, 1970
April 16, 1963
January 14, 1956
October 5, 1973

July 10, 1974
December 10, 1980

September 16, 1955

July 10, 1974

August 22, 1962
August 24, 1963
October 28, 1964
November 13, 1981
September 16, 1955
October 5, 1955
January 23, 1971
December 18, 1956
January 21, 1958
January 20, 1959
September 16, 1955
January 24, 1957
April 28, 1956
September 7, 1966
September 16, 1955
October 17, 1959
July 27, 1956
January 22, 1959
October 15, 1955
October 26, 1965
November 19, 1968

February 28, 1978
August 14, 1982
December 27, 1976
August 5, 1975
June 18, 1983
December I, 1982
December II, 1975
June 7, 1975
July 10, 1974

June 18, 1976
March 7, 1980
April 17, 1980
July 11, 1979
May 8 1983
March 29, 1979

November 13, 1981
May 6,1980
July 10, 1974

January 25, 1980
October 21, 1977
July 10, 1974
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signatories at least as much copyright protection as that state accords
works of its own nationals first published there. 204
A French court has ruled that, aside from whether French do
mestic copyright law applies, a videogame registered with the U.S.
Copyright Office is protected in France by virtue of Article II of the
Universal Copyright Convention, signed "by the United States and
France: ". . . published works of nationals of any contracting state
and works first published in that state shall enjoy in each contracting
state the same protection as that other state accords in its own terri
tory, as well as the protection specifically granted by the
Convention. "205
One question pertinent to the program milieu is whether this obli
gation applies to rights not contained in the state's copyright laws, but
which may be rights in the nature of copyright. More specifically, if a
foreign country's copyright law does not permit protection of pro
grams, but its trade secret, patent, or other laws provide rights in the
nature of copyright protection for the programs, can a U.S. national
March 12, 1968
Mauritius
October 31, 1975
May 12, 1957
Mexica
September 16, 1955
December 13, 1974
Monaco
May 8,1972
January 28, 1976
Morocco
June 22, 1967
Netherlands
September 11, 1964
New Zealand
Nicaragua
August 16, 1961
Nigeria
February 14, 1962
Norway
January 23, 1963
August 7, 1974
September 16, 1955
Pakistan
October 17, 1962
Panama
September 3, 1980
Paraguay
March 11, 1962
October 16, 1963
Peru
Phillippines
November 19, 1955
March 9, 1977
March 9, 1977
Poland
Portugal
December 25, 1956
July 30, 1981
Senegal
July 9, 1974
July 10, 1974
May 27, 1973
Soviet Union
Spain
September 16, 1955
July 10, 1974
January 25, 1984
January 25, 1984
Sri Lanka
July 10, 1974
July 1, 1961
Sweden
March 30, 1956
Switzerland
June 10, 1975
June 19, 1969
Tunisia
July 10, 1974
September 27, 1957
United Kingdom
July 10, 1974
United States of America
September 16, 1955
September 30, 1966
Venezuela
July 10, 1974
Yugoslavia
May 11, 1966
June 1, 1965
Zambia
204. 4 M. NIMMER, supra note 201, § 1704[B].
205. Universal Copyright Convention, Art. II, completed at Geneva on Sept. 6,
1952.
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claim such protection by virtue of the convention?206

B. Foreign Domestic Law
Based on reports believed reliable, the following sets forth, if in
somewhat fragmentary form, the existing and prospective domestic
law of program protection for a number of foreign countries. 207 In
general, the application of law to the program scenario is less well
developed abroad that in the United States.
1.

Japan 208

Taito v. [NG Enterprises 209 was an action for infringement of a
copyright on a program written in assembly language. The alleged
infringement constituted copying a ROM embodying the program. 210
206. To the extent such other laws do not distinguish between nationals and foreign
ers, perhaps nothing turns on the answer to this question.
207. The following section on foreign domestic law is based, in part, on various
materia1s, believed to embody accurate information, which have come to the author's atten
tion. It is designed to serve merely as a survey of current software protection law develop
ments in progress. Where possible, the author has provided complete citations to foreign
case law, statutory law, and secondary sources.
208. The information on Japan has been derived from the English Edition of
Yamasaki, Japanese Case Law Report, AIPPI J. 107 (Sept. 1983).
209. Id. at 107-08. Tokyo Dist. Ct., Dec. 6, 1982.
210. Id. at 108-09. The Japanese copyright act provides in part:
"(Definitions)
Article 2
"(I) The terms in each of the following items shall have the meaning as defined in
each item as far as the present Law is concerned:
1. Work - Creative expression ofthoughts or sentiments which falls within the
literary, scientific, artistic or musical domain.

•••

15. Reproduction - Remaking in a tangible form by means ofprintlng, photog
raphy, copying, sound or visual recording and other methods [the remainder
omitted].

• ••

"(Exemplification of works)
"Article 10
"(I) The works of the present Law shall comprise the following by way of
example:
1. novels, dramas, articles, lectures and other literary works
2. works of music
3. works of choreography or pantomime
4. paintings, engravings, sculptures and other works of
art
5. works of architecture
6. works of cartography and other figurative works of
scientific nature, such as plans, charts and models
7. works of cinematography
8. works of photography
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The issues were whether a program may constitute a copyrightable
work and whether an object program embodied in ROM constitutes a
copy.211
Defendant argued that this program was not copyrightable be
cause the symbolic source language was not readily comprehensible to
people and, therefore, was not a means for expressing thought. The
court held that the program was indeed copyrightable and that the
ROM embodying the object code constituted a copy. The object ofthe
program was to cause a display of a video game, and the expression in
symbolic language was comprehensible to persons with expert knowl
edge. Different programs could produce the same result and the pro
gram was seen by the court as a creative expression of thought, and
copyrightable. The court noted that the object program embodied in
ROM was a mechanical conversion of the source program. No crea
tivity was involved in converting one into the other. Creating such a
ROM constituted making a copy of the source program.
On the legislative front, a subcommittee of the Copyright Council

•••
"(Right of reproduction)
"Article 21
An author shall have an exclusive right to reproduce his works.

•••

"(Right of injunction)
"Article 112
"(I) An author, copyright owner or owner of the rights of publication or neigh
boring rights may demand that those who infringe or are likely to infringe his
copyright, rights of publication or neighboring rights take measures to effect dis
continuance or prevention of such infringement.

•••

"(Acts deemed to be infringements)
"Article 113
"(I) The following acts shall be deemed to be infringements on the relevant
moral rights, copyright, rights of publication or neighboring rights:

•••

2. acts to knowingly distribute those items produced by acts infringing moral
rights, copyright, rights of publication or neighboring rights (including those
items imported as provided for in the preceding item)

•••

"(presumption of the amount of damage, etc.)
"Article 114
"(1) When a. copyright owner, owner of the rights of publication or neighboring
rights demands damages caused by infringement on such copyright, rights of pub
lication or neighboring rights from those who effected such infringement, if such
infringers have acquired profits by such acts of infringement, the amount of such
profits shall be presumed to be the amount of damage said copyright owner,
owner of the rights of publication or the neighboring rights has suffered."

Id.
211. Id.
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(an advisory body to the Education Ministry) has proposed a fifty year
term of copyright for programs. The Ministry for Posts and Telecom
munications has also expressed an interest in the matter. However,
the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) has pro
posed a fifteen year term (the same as for Japanese patents), with au
thority in the government to require compulsory licensing for a fee.
The MITI proposal was withdrawn in 1984 but is expected to resur
face in spring, 1985. In the United States, the Computer business
Equipment Manufacturers Association (CBEMA) stated that its mem
bers would reevaluate their plans in Japan if the MITI proposal were
adopted; CBEMA has urged that Congress consider reciprocal
measures.
2.
a.

Germany

Patents

Prior to 1974, German courts permitted patents on certain
programmable processes and programmed machines. In 1974, the
German courts did an about face, and they have been negative ever
since. Indeed, German courts have enunciated a number of negative
rules, but no positive rules for patentability.
In 1978, the Federal Republic of Germany enacted a new patent
act in accord with the European Patent Convention. In the Act, pro
grams are expressly excluded as such from patentability.
b.

Copyright

VisiCorp brought an action in the Munich trial court against a
group of German companies, alleging that they copied its VisiCorp
program. 2 12
Section 2 of the German Copyright Act lists, inter alia, literary
linguistic works, or representations of a scientific or technological na
ture. Under German copyright law, a work within one of these cate
gories, which is a personal intellectual creation, constitutes
copyrightable subject matter. The court held that if the task permitted
several different solutions, then the creative intellectual content of a
program would be expressed by the choice, collection, review, arrange
ment, and classification of the material. The court further held that
programs meet the linguistic requirement despite the fact that pro
grams are written in a special computer language and can be read only
by special means.
212.

VisiCorp. v. Basis Software GMBH (21 Dec. 1982).
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Moreover, the court ruled that a program also meets the scientific
and technical requirement and that the intellectual-aesthetic content
could be found not only in the visually perceptible form, but also "in
the content of ideas which can be expressed in the formation and se
quence of thoughts of the represented concepts and/or in the special
intellectual form and kind of collection, classification and arrangement
of the offered material."213
In VisiCorp, with a relatively complex program with about
10,000 instructions, the court has ample opportunity for personal crea
tive formation entering into the program itself. Accordingly, the court
held it copyrightable under Section 2.214 The decision is on appeal,
with a ruling expected in 1985. The trial court in Cassel and the trial
court in Mosbach have also held programs copyrightable. However,
these decisions conflicted with a 1981 decision handed down by a trial
court in Mannheim.
Several laws pertaining to software protection are being consid
ered. One would proscribe illegal copying of software, and another
would make theft of programs a crime. According to an official in the
German Ministry of Justice,
there is no question that the loading of the program into the com
puter system is a copying of the program. But what about the run
ning of the program? . .. In my opinion, the answer has to be in
the affirmative. When running the program, the transfer of each bit
of information from one storage location to another within the com
puter is copying the program. 2lS

3.

Canada216

As of summer, 1984, there were several pending cases involving
copyrightability of programs in Canada, but no decisions.
In May, 1984 the Canadian government released a "White Pa
per" proposing revisions to the Copyright Act. Among the proposals
was one which would protect machine-readable data bases and com
puter programs and data bases for five years. Programs in human
readable form would, as in the past, receive protection similar to that
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Statement of Margaret Moeller, counselor in charge of copyright and publish
ing law, Ministry of Justice, Federal Republic of Germany. 28 PAT. TRADEMARK &
CoPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 183 (Aug. 30, 1984).
216. See generally, Canadian Government Wants Limited Protection for Programs,
CoMP. L. & TAX REp. 1 (Aug. 1984); and White Paper Outlines Changes in Canadian
Copyright Statute, 28 PAT. TRADEMARK, & CoPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 132 (May 31, 1984).
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afforded traditional literary works for fifty years plus life, with the
owner having the right to prevent making machine-readable programs.
If it is the human-readable program that is published, this right would
terminate five years after the end of the year of creation of the human
readable program in human-readable form.
For an unpublished program in machine-readable form, the copy
right holder would have the right to publish in machine-readable
form, to reproduce, and to make a human-readable program based on
it. However, he or she would not have the right to rent or use. Under
this proposal, selling, leasing, licensing, trading, or offering to do any
of these would be an act of publication. An unpublished machine
readable program would be protected for five years from creation. If
published, protection would run until five years after the end of the
year of publication. However, if published more than five years after
creation, the program would be ineligible for copyright protection.
4.
a.

United Kingdom217

Patent

In the U.K., trade secret, contract, copyright (without registra
tion or publication requirement), and patent are available to protect
programs.
In 1979, the U.K. passed a new Patent Act to bring about accord
with the European Patent Convention and no pertinent decisions are
yet available under the new act, although patents have regularly been
granted for program implemented processes and systems. The new
contributory infringement section of the Patent Act may well apply to
the distribution of computer programs which would produce infringe
ment when used.
There are at least two organizations in the U.K. devoted to re
straining the activities of computer software pirates: Federation
Against Software Theft (FAST), and Federation Against Copyright
Theft (FACT).
b.

Copyright

Although the Copyright Act of 1956 makes no specific reference
to programs,218 a number of cases have stated that programs would be
protected as "literary works." In several cases granting ex parte appli
cations to seize infringing goods, courts ruled that object code was a
217. See generally Bishop, Legal Protection 0/ Computer Programs in the United
Kingdom, 5 NW 1. INT'L L. & Bus. 269 (1983).
218. Copyright Act, 1956,4 & 5 Eliz. 2, Ch. 74
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reproduction or an adaptation of source code. 219
In a form not visible to humans, programs would probably still
qualify as literary works, even though they would not be "writings."
Published and unpublished works are protected by the act, and regis
tration is not required. Copyright inheres at the time the unpublished
literary work is make. It inheres in published works on first
publication.
c.

Interaction of Copyright and Trade Secret

Sometimes the owner may seek both copyright and trade secret
protection for a program. Software used only in-house may be copy
righted under section 2(1) ofthe 1956 Act as an unpublished work and
may also be protected by confidentiality clauses. Here the principles
of copyright and trade secret do not conflict.
However, where copyright attaches under section 2(2) by virtue
of publication, it is uncertain whether trade secret protection may also
be claimed. Whether trade secret can be claimed will depend on the
type of publication. English law is unclear as to what degree of publi
cation is necessary before the information ceases to be protectable by
trade secret. However, confidentiality is not stripped away merely
where programs are marketed widely, even though capable of reverse
engineering. The question then becomes how much work has to be
done to accomplish the reverse engineering. In the case of multiple
disclosures such as to licensees, the law is less likely to impose an obli
gation of confidence where none is specifically set forth in the license
agreement.
Publication is insufficient to cause copyright to attach under sec
tion 2(2) unless it is "intended to satisfy the reasonable requirements
of the public."220 Placing a program on general sale to computer own
ers does not necessarily end any claims to confidentiality. The pro
gram may be protected as a trade secret if significant effort would be
required to reverse engineer or copy the program. Publication to
licensees would not necessarily end confidentiality of the software, es
pecially if the license agreement contained a confidentiality clause.
Many licensed programs would be protected under both the Copyright
Act and trade secret law.
219. Sega v. Richards, [1983] F.S.R. 73; System v. Landon, [1983] F.S.R. 313;
Thrustone v. W.W Computer, [1983] F.S.R. 502; Format Conv. v. lIT, [1983] F.S.R. 473.
220. Copyright Act 1956, § 49 (2)(b).
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France221

French law offers six methods which may be used to secure
software protection.
Although French patent law excludes patentability for a com
puter program as such,222 a system or an embodied process may be
patented. French design protection can be used to protect video
games and other visual displays resulting from a program. It does not
protect utilitarian objects when their designs are totally dependent on
their utilitarian character. Registration of a picture or drawing is re
quired, and the protection period is twenty-five years, renewable for
another twenty-five years. At the depositor's request, the deposit will
be kept secret.
While French copyright law does not include programs expressly,
a number of decisions have protected programs embodied in ROM or
on a tape or diskette, whether operating systems or application pro
grams, and whether in source or object code. An original literary or
artistic work accrues copyright protection at creation, and registration
is not required.
A program is original if the result of an intellectual creative pro
cess and if the program itself does not follow directly from the goal set
by the programmer (Le., there must be choices among various pro
gramming steps).
French law recognizes protection through total or partial secrecy.
In the case of total secrecy (where the program is disclosed to no one
outside the enterprise), one who steals it through an employee is liable
under the criminal law. In the case of partial secrecy (where there is a
license with non-disclosure agreement), the civil law provides a rem
edy. Secrecy does not preclude protection by copyright law.
Among the remedies provided by criminal law are unlawful dis
closure of a trade secret,223 disclosure of a professional secret,224 abuse
of confidence,225 corruption,226 and theft.227 A decision under Article
418 held that it applied to programs; applicability had been unclear
221. See generally BERTRAND, LEGAL PROTECfION OF CoMPUTER SOFIWARE IN
1984 DEVELOPMENTS, III SOFlWARE PROTECfION 1 (1984).
222. See Article 6 of the French Patent Law (adapted to Article 52 of the European
Patent Convention).
223. Penal Code Art. 418.
224. Art. 378.
225. Art. 408.
226. Art. 177-79.
227. Art. 379.
FRANCE:
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because courts traditionally did not apply this provision to services. 228
The civil law recognizes causes of action for misappropriation of
intellectual work and for unjust enrichment.
When several employees collaborate to produce a work, and the
contribution of each cannot be separated from the whole,' the law
deems it a "collective work," which belongs to the employer.
There have been a number of projects directed toward the issue of
how software should be protected. In August, 1983, the Minister of
Industry established a commission under the guidance of the patent
office to report on the present status and to propose changes. A report
presented in December, 1983, suggested continuing present law but
adding a new system of protection specifically directed to computer
programs and providing twenty years of protection for algorithms of
registered programs.
6.

Australia

In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Computer Edge Pty, Ltd.,229 the trial
court denied protection, finding that computer programs were not
within the subject matter copyrightable under Australian law. The
appellate court reversed. In light of the confusion, the Copyright Act
of 1968 was amended. However, the new act does not specifically ex
tend protection to machine-readable software. 23o
228.

SESA C.v. TC NANTERRE, 5 Mai 1981, reported in Expertises 1983, No. 57 at

579.
229. [1984] F.S.R. 246 Rev. 53.
230. Copyright Amendment 1984, No. 43.:
1. adding a definition of "computer program" to of the Act as follows:
" 'computer program' means and expression, in any language, code or notation,
of a set of instructions (whether with or without related information) intended,
either directly or after either or both of the following:
(a) conversion to another language, code or notation;
(b) reproduction in a different material form, to cause a device having digital
information processing capabilities to perform a particular function";
2. adding to the existing category or "literary works" in Section 10 the following:
"(a) a table, or compilation expressed in words, figures or symbols (whether or
not in a visible form);
(b) a computer program or compilation of computer program";
3. Specifically defining an "adaptation" of a computer program to include a transla
tion from one language to another, i.e., "a version of the work (whether or not in the
language, code or notation in which the work was originally expressed) not being a repro
duction of the work" (Section 10);
4. redefining the term "infringing copy" in section 10 to include copies of adaptations
of works and to remove an anomaly whereby software imported with permission might
nevertheless technically be considered an infringing copy;
5. defining "material form" in Section 10 to include "any form (whether visible or
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South Africa

In a 1981 case, plaintiff's employee developed an accounting
package for professionals, but refused to turn over the source code to
his employer. 231 The court held that under the applicable 1978 Copy
right Act, these programs were copyrightable subject matter, and that
the employee owned them. 232 The court did not proscribe his redevel
opment of similar programs ab initio, even were he to use the knowl
edge he had gained. Certain language in the case suggests that data
bases are not protectable under South African copyright law.
8.

Brazil

Brazil appears ready to create a system of legal protection unique
not) of storage from which the work or adaptation, or a substantial part of the work or
adaptation, can be reproduced";
6. creating a presumption that the making of a back-up copy of a computer program
is not an infringement by adding a new Section 43A, which states:
"43A. (1) Subject to sub-section (2), the copyright in a literary work being a
computer program is not infringed by the making of a reproduction of the work,
or of a computer program being an adaptation of the work, if
(a) the reproduction is made by, or on behalf of, the owner of the copy (in this
Section referred to as the 'original copy') from which the reproduction is
made; and
(b) the reproduction is made for the purpose only of being used, by or on behalf
ofthe owner of the original copy, in lieu of the original copy in the event the
original copy is lost, destroyed or rendered unusable.
(2) Sub-section (1) does not apply to the making of a reproduction of a computer
program, or of an adaptation of a computer program
(a) from an infringing copy of the computer program; or
(b) contrary to an express direction by or on behalf of the owner of the copy
right in the computer program given to the owner of the original copy not
later than the time when the owner of the original copy acquired the original
copy.
(3) For the purposes of this section
(a) a reference to a copy of a computer program or of an adaptation of a com
puter program is a reference to any article in which the computer program
or adaptation is reproduced in a material form; and
(b) a reference to an express direction, in relation to a copy of a computer pro
gram or of adaptation of a computer program, includes a reference to a
clearly legible direction printed on the copy or on a package in which the
copy is supplied";
7. extending "the anti-piracy" provisions of the current law (Section 132) to cover
creation of infringing copies by telephone or radio transmission of a program;
8. Creating an offense for advertising the supply of infringing copies of a program;
9. conferring copyright protection on existing programs; and,
10. exempting actions that took place prior to the commencement of the amendments
from being considered infringements.
231. Northern Office Microcomputers v. Rosenstein, 1981 (4 C.P.D. 123).
232. A 1980 amendment apparently has altered the situation so that the employer
would own programs written after May 22, 1980.
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to computer programs. 233 Under the draft being circulated in late
summer, 1984, the law would require registration of source and object
code as a condition for protection, and would grant exclusive rights
for ten years. All documentation, including source code, would be
maintained in sealed form by the government to insure free use upon
expiration.
To maintain the registration, the producer would be compelled to
provide technical assistance to users during the registration period,
and in the event of national urgency, would be required to grantthird
parties the right to reproduce. Compulsory licensing of Brazilian
companies would be required. 234 In addition, there would be a re
quirement for active use of the software, possibly within two years of
registration. 235
9.

Hungary236

"Authorities" have determined that software is covered under the
country's existing copyright law as a writing, albeit a special type.
Hungary favors utilizing copyright protection, rather than creating sui
generis protection for software, both because it would require time to
develop a unique system and because such protection would be limited
to a single country without possibility of similar international
protection. 237

to. Taiwan
The Taiwanese legislature is expected to receive in 1984 a revised
copyright bill which would explicitly extend protection to
programs.238
11.

Mexico

Mexico began accepting programs for copyright registration in
October, 1984. Mexico appears to be closely watching events in
Brazi1. 239
233. Such a conclusion seemed apparent by the end of an international seminar on
legal protection of software, held in Brasilia in early summer 1984. The seminar was under
the auspices of the Special Secretariat for Information, which was expected to. propose such
a software protection law by the end of 1984.
234. This requirement is similar to that found in Brazilian patent law.
235. 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 482 (Aug. 30, 1984).
236. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
237. 28 PAT. TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 482 (Aug. 30, 1984), Report 0/
Gyorgy Palos, Director 0/ the Legal Department, Bureau 0/ Copyright Protection.
238. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
239. Id.
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Spain

Spain is amending its copyright law. 240 Despite internal pressure
to dilute software protection, Spain must strengthen intellectual prop
erty protection as a prerequisite for entry into the European
community.
1~.

Colombia

Based on reports believed reliable,241 Columbia is closely watch
ing events in Brazil with respect to developing domestic laws for pro
gram protection.
14.

Malaysia

The government intends242 to amend its copyright law, strength
ening protection. Domestic manufacturers seek increased protection
so as to better participate in joint ventures with foreign software man
ufacturers. However, the National Computer Board is looking seri
ously at the Japanese MITI approach.

15.

Singapore

Reliable reports 243 indicate that Singapore, like Malaysia, intends
to amend its copyright law to strengthen program protection.

16.

Thailand

Thailand, like Malaysia and Singapore, is preparing to amend its
copyright law to strengthen program protection. 244

17.

Sweden

Sweden is considering legislation similar to U.S. copyright
legislation.245
18.

Netherlands

The Netherlands is considering legislation similar to U.S. copy
right legislation. 246
240.
241.
242.
243.

244.
245.
246.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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EXTRALEGAL MEANS FOR PROTECTING PROGRAMS

Legal means are but one vehicle for seeking to protect programs,
and there are certain other means which may be at least as effective in
a given situation. In addition to the suggestions in this section, some
of those set forth below247 bear on extralegal methods of protection.
Basically, extralegal means of achieving protection are based on struc
turing the commercial environment in such a way as to reduce the
incentive to misappropriate, and the use of technology so as to render
it more difficult to misappropriate.
Commercially, there are two steps which some licensors may take
to protect their investment in programs. The first is to provide main
tenance for their licensed programs. Although the licensor generally
undertakes significant (sometimes massive) debugging activities before
licensing, the typical licensed program is an extremely complex item,
containing numerous bugs which will manifest themselves on a contin
uing basis for years. Anyone of these is capable, under the right
(more appropriately, the wrong) set of circumstances, of immobilizing
a licensee's efforts when a bug causes the program to cease running or
to run improperly. Most licensees will, therefore, be willing to pay an
additional fee for licensor maintenance (sometimes called "support").
In providing this support, the licensor agrees, on a timely basis, to
remedy any bug uncovered by the licensee. Some licensors market the
support under the basic licensing agreement, while others may market
it as an additional optional item. Yet others offer no support.
A second commercial offering which may afford some protection
is providing program enhancements. Many programs are such that it
is economically feasible to improve them as time progresses. For ex
ample, new options may be added to increase the number of functions
which the program can perform. Furthermore, changes may be made
in certain algorithms to reduce running time. Where enhancements
are to be supplied, provision is generally made in the licensing
agreement.
The value of a program without support or right to enhancement
(this is what a misappropriator generally gets) is often far less than
that of a supported program with enhancement rights. Accordingly,
the incentive to misappropriate the bare program is reduced
somewhat.
Technologically, one might alter either the software or the hard
ware in such a manner that each physical programming device, or
247. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
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copies of it, will operate only with a specific computer. For example,
provision might be made in the program to incorporate a comparison
between the serial number of the computer on which the program is
running 248 and the serial number of the computer for which the pro
gram is licensed. 249 This technique can cause complications and is
often not done today. One complication is that such a program will
not run on a "back-up" computer in the event that the licensee's com
puter fails to function.
Another technological means for thwarting piracy is a
microprocessor chip which can be inserted in the computer to provide
a deciphering function. The program itself is encrypted before being
provided to the licensee, and the chip is designed to decipher the en
crypted program. The encrypted program is useless without the
chip.2s0
None of these technological methods is foolproof, and each sim
ply increases the difficulty, cost, or risk which a would-be pirate must
incur.
IX.
A.

CONTRACTING SUGGESTIONS

Proprietary Suggestions

The license generally is restricted to a single particular computer
(identified in the agreement by serial number). If use on more than
one computer is desired, the additional computers are treated as call
ing for additional licenses (often at reduced royalties). One exception
commonly found in licenses is that in the event the identified computer
fails to function properly, use may be made on a "back-up" computer.
Limiting use to a single comp.uter is regarded as an important method
of limiting improper proliferation.
The license will specify the form of the program to be provided to
the licensee. Generally, the source code form is more valuable to the
licensee, and may be priced higher and be subject to more restrictions.
If source code is provided, flow charts and listings may also be pro
vided. Alternatively, a licensor may transfer only the object code
form, accompanied by as little documentation as possible.
Much of the agreement should deal explicitly with the protection
of proprietary rights. The licensee may acknowledge the licensor's
ownership of intangible property in the program, be it trade secrets,
248. While the program is running on the computer, it can"read" this serial number.
249. This serial number can be written into each licensed programming device by the
licensor.
250. For one such chip, see U.S. Patent No. 4,168,396.
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confidential information, patent rights, or copyrights. Where trade se
cret material is involved, the agreement should explicitly establish a
confidential relationship, and may specify that all tangible materials
transferred to the licensee remain the licensor's property. The licensee
should be obligated not to engage in any use, transfer, or disclosure of
licensed materials and information except as expressly set forth in the
agreement. He should further be obligated to inform his employees
and agents who may come into contact with the materials of their
confidential nature, and should agree to take reasonable precautions to
prevent any unauthorized use, transfer, or disclosure and, failing this,
to report all such instances to the licensor. The licensee should also
agree to cooperate with the licensor in the event of any litigation con
cerning the matter.
The specific uses to which the licensee may put the transferred
material should be set forth. In particular, the matter of how much
and what type of copying (if any) is to be permitted, should be ex
pressly set forth. The licensee may be obligated to keep records of his
copying, and even to number his copies. Of great importance is that
each copy bear the appropriate notice, be it a notice that an algorithm
is patented, that a program is copyrighted, or of a proprietary interest.
All notices on programs should be present in human-readable form on
the programming device, and in machine-readable form at the begin
ning and end of the program (and perhaps at certain intermediate
locations).
Most licenses do not permit sublicensing, but where it is permit
ted (as when the licensee is a service bureau operating, for lease on a
time-sharing basis, a computer and numerous programs for use on it),
the licensee must agree to impose restrictions on his sublicensees if
there is any way the latter can obtain access to the program code.
When a program is licensed in source code, the licensee may
make modifications (unless prevented by the agreement). Accord
ingly, it is well for the agreement to state what the parties' rights will
be to those modifications. The licensee should also agree that on ter
mination of the license, the licensed program will be deleted from any
modification.
Finally, the agreement should set forth the disposition of all li
censed materials and copies thereof at termination of the agreement.
Return to the licensor may be best, but most licenses provide in the
alternative for destruction and certification thereof. Further, any con
fidentiality provision should survive the agreement.
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Other Provisions

The duration of a license agreement may be perpetual, or may be
a fixed term. If enhancements are included, the agreement should
probably be for a fixed term so as to accommodate changes in licensing
policy.
The licensing fee is often payable as a single lump sum. The pro
grams licensed should be identified (perhaps on an appended sched
ule), and there may be provision for adding programs in the future. It
should be made clear whether the license for the stated fee includes
maintenance, enhancements, training, and any modifications necessary
to fit the licensee's system. Most program licenses are non-exclusive
(otherwise the parties would probably agree to a sale), and most licen
sors prefer them to be non-transferable so that they have some knowl
edge as to who has their program, and who is supposed to be paying
for its use.
A typical agreement also attempts to resolve the issue of liability
in the event of program malfunction (e.g., limited to fee paid; includ
ing indirect and consequential damages) and discusses warranty mat
ters (e.g., "as is" without warranty; disclaimer of warranty of
merchantability or fitness; warranty only of conformity to printed
specifications; warranty acknowledging use). The answer to the ques
tion of whether a particular warranty limitation is enforceable will
often depend on the particular state in question. The agreement may
also include a provision concerning indemnification (including legal
expenses) for patent or copyright infringement or trade secret/confi
dential information misappropriation.
Generally, the licensee may terminate at will, and the licensor
may terminate for cause (e.g., breach of agreement, including breach
of confidence or failure to pay fees; or indications of bankruptcy).
Other matters which may be dealt with in the agreement are responsi
bility for any applicable taxes, choice of law, and an integration
clause. 2s1
X.

SUGGESTED LICENSOR PROCEDURES

The licensor should take certain steps to see that its proprietary
interests are not compromised. If it seeks patent protection, it must
proceed in timely fashion. If it relies on copyright, it must be careful
251. Because of the frequency with which misunderstandings seem to permeate com
puter-related (and specifically software-related) transactions, attempts to introduce parol
evidence at trial are quite common.
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to place its copyright notice appropriately.2s2 In the case of trade se
cret protection, he should mark all programs and documentation with
appropriate legends, and maintain good internal security predicated
on distribution on a "need to know" basis, employee confidentiality
agreements, notice to employees as to what materials are confidential,
and in some cases even secured (guards, fences, etc.) premises. Most
importantly, this must all be part of a program, so that the existence of
re~lar procedures can be established in the event of litigation.
In the event of copyright or trade secret protection it may be
Jtelpful to introduce into each licensed program a "house mark" con
sisting of a few trivial and non-functional instructions whose only pur
pose is to indicate the licensor as the source of the program. The same
house mark may be used in all programs, or each package shipped
Play contain a different one in an attempt to trace any "leak."
In policing against infringement or misappropriation, the licensor
will generally find it difficult to identify the instances where a pirate
Uses the program unlawfully. However, occasional piracy by use only
will generally not inflict severe economic harm. Significant injury
would result where a pirate attempts to market the program in compe
tition with its rightful proprietor. In that situation, however, the un
lawful conduct is much more likely to come to the proprietor's
attention. If the proprietor has carefully preserved its rights, it may be
able to persuade or compel the pirate to cease and desist, and to rem
edy any injury.

252. For the statute, and Copyright Office rules, on affixation and positioning of
copyright notice on programs, see 17 U.S.C. §401 (1976); 37 C.F.R. §§201.20, 202.2 (1984).

